Fabio v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ETC., 414 A. 2d 82 - Pa: Supreme Court 1980
Jackson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 164 - Ark: Court of Appeals, 2nd Div. 2015
Cranston v. City of Richmond, 710 P. 2d 845 - Cal: Supreme Court 1985
[15] Contrary to appellant's assertion, it is clear that the requisite "nexus" exists between appellant's conduct and his fitness to perform the duties of a police officer (Morrison, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 235-238; Perea, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d 939, 942). Carelessness, poor judgment, disregard for the safety of others and, most importantly, a "blatant disregard" of the very laws which it was appellant's duty to enforce, clearly reflect upon appellant's fitness to perform the duties of a police officer. (See, e.g., Hooks v. State Personnel Bd. (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 572, 577 [168 Cal. Rptr. 822]; Vielehr v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 32 Cal. App.3d at p. 194.)
Dept. of Public Safety v. Johnson, 66 So. 3d 703 - Miss: Court of Appeals 2011
Boyer v. Department of Public Safety and Corrections, La: Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit 2009
Kennedy v. Schlosser, Dist. Court, ND Iowa 2012
"While Waller can testify generally regarding the nationally accepted standards of police practice, as found in The Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, he may not render any opinion regarding whether the officers in this case were compliant with those standards. Finally, whether the Dubuque Police Department conducted an internal affairs investigation following the incident is irrelevant. In short, the jury must hear the evidence, decide what testimony to believe..."
City of Memphis v. CIVIL SERVICE COM'N, 216 SW 3d 311 - Tenn: Supreme Court 2007
City of Amarillo v. BYTHEWAY, 547 SW 2d 674 - Tex: Court of Civil Appeals, 7th Dist. 1977
Faulkner v. CITY OF BARTLETT, Tenn: Court of Appeals 2009
Robinson v. MEMPHIS-SHELBY COUNTY AIRPORT AUTHORITY, Tenn: Court of Appeals 2012
Pierce v. Kiesewetter, Cal: Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate Dist., 3rd Div. 2007
"In Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d 194, the California Supreme Court held that permanent civil service employees have a property interest in continued employment."
Attorney General v. McHatton, 428 Mass. 790 - Mass: Supreme Judicial Court 1999
The defendant's criminal dishonesty also violated the oath he took when he became a police officer to uphold the laws of the 795*795 United States, as well as regulations of the Chelsea police department establishing a "Law Enforcement Code of Ethics." Provisions of the latter called on a police officer to "keep [his] private life unsullied as an example to all"; to "recognize the badge of [his] office as a symbol of public faith and ... accept it as a public trust"; to be "[h]onest in thought and deed ... both [in] personal and official life"; and to be "exemplary in obeying the laws of the land."[4] The United States District Court judge who sentenced the defendant recognized that the defendant had committed a serious violation of his sworn obligations to obey and uphold the law. The judge, as part of the sentencing proceedings, admonished the defendant for his crimes in these terms: "[Y]ou, of all people, as a senior law enforcement officer, had a duty to obey to the letter all of the laws you swore to uphold. You abused that duty and your office.... Any time you as a senior police officer knowingly violate a public law, you compromise your ability to enforce the law fully and you make yourself a target for blackmail.... When you or any other senior officer in a police force violates the law, you abuse a position of public and private trust; and your conviction for violating the tax laws unfairly taints the reputation of every honest police officer in Chelsea."
State v. Louis, 457 NW 2d 484 - Wis: Supreme Court 1990
In Wood, the Supreme Court stated the rationale for its rule as follows:
"We think that the imputation of bias simply by virtue of governmental employment, without regard to any actual partiality growing out of the nature and circumstances of particular cases, rests on an assumption without any rational foundation."...Id. at 724. We agree with that declaration. Absent actual proof to the contrary elicited during voir dire, there is simply no basis for concluding that law enforcement officials would not act in accordance with their sworn duty and decide a case impartially on the basis of the evidence presented."